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ABSTRACT

This Article is on the interrelationship of the Texas Disaster Act and
Texas Government Code Section 22.0035. The author demonstrates that
the Governor of Texas and the Texas Supreme Court have grossly violated
the separation of powers on a continuing basis since March 29, 2020 by
Governor Abbott issuing Executive Order 13, which prohibits the granting
of bail to anyone awaiting trial, and the Texas Supreme Court’s
unwillingness to invalidate that order administratively or judicially. Finally,
the Article addresses the nearly one thousand district and county court
judges who are constantly violating the separations of powers by failing to
invalidate the order, choosing instead to follow it and thereby subject
thousands of Texas citizens to unlawful incarceration. The violation of the
Texas Constitution by two branches of government who are wholly ignoring
clear and unambiguous statutes passed by the Texas legislature is simply
alarming.
I. INTRODUCTION
On Thanksgiving Day in 2017, Damon Allen, a 41-year-old highway
patrol trooper, was gunned down during a traffic stop near Fairfield, which
is a Texas town approximately sixty miles east of Waco, Texas.1 The suspect
was 33-year old Dabrett Black, who was out of jail on bond.2 Prior to the
killing, he had been arrested for allegedly assaulting a Smith County deputy.3
What heightened the outcry of the trooper’s death was a bail reform bill,
1. Jolie McCullough, Texas Gov. Greg Abbott Proposes Bail Reform after Death of DPS Trooper,
THE TEX. TRIB. (Aug. 7, 2018, 9:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/08/07/greg-abbottbail-reform-proposal/ [https://perma.cc/8Y6Z-BRME].
2. Id.
3. Id.
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which failed to pass in the 2017 Legislative Session.4 The author of the bill
was Senator John Whitmire, a Democrat from Houston.5 He responded to
the tragic news by stating: “If we’re going to do bail bond reform, we ought
to do real bail bond reform and look at the bill that passed the Senate last
session . . . . The first part of my proposal would have prevented that guy
from having a bond at all.”6
In the 2019 Legislative Session, Senator Whitmire and State
Representative Andrew Murr, a Republican from Junction, filed identical
bills in the two houses for consideration of Senator Whitmire’s bill that
failed in the 2017 Session.7 However, the governor worked with
State Representative Kyle Kacal of College Station to achieve his goal of bail
reform.8 The major difference between Representative Kacal’s bill and the
other two bills filed was that it would vest with the governor’s office the
power to “develop the tool and recommend best practices for pretrial
release decisions.”9 Even though Representative Kacal’s H.B. 2020 did in
fact pass in the house of representatives, it died in the senate.10
Thereby, through two legislative sessions, Governor Abbott’s goal had
been wholly frustrated: “Our goal at the same time is to make sure that if
there are criminals who are dangerous who pose a threat to a law
enforcement officer or the community, we’re going to get them off the street
and keep them off the street.”11
Not long after the governor’s legislative defeat, it goes without need of
citation that a very different, much more catastrophic, ongoing event

4. See id. (notating the bill passed in the senate chamber but did not pass in the house chamber);
see also Tex. S.B. 1338, 85th Leg., R.S. (2017) (indicating twenty-six senators voted “yea” to pass the
bill).
5. See Tex. S.B. 1338, 85th Leg., R.S. (2017) (indicating bill by Senator Whitmire).
6. McCullough, supra note 1.
7. See Tex. S.B. 628, 86th Leg., R.S. (2019); Tex. H.B. 1323, 86th Leg., R.S. (2019).
8. See Jolie McCullough, Gov. Greg Abbott’s Influence has Shifted Texas Bail Reform Efforts Toward a
Bill that Would Give Him More Control, THE TEX. TRIB. (Mar. 18, 2019, 12:00 PM), https://www.texas
tribune.org/2019/03/18/bail-reform-texas-legislature-damon-allen-act-bills/ [https://perma.cc/6K
LR-2G53] (noting Representative Kacal’s comments that he worked with Governor Abbott to craft
the bill).
9. Id.
10. See Mary Mergler, What Went Right with Criminal Justice Reform in the 86th Session, TEX.
APPLESEED (June 27, 2019), https://www.texasappleseed.org/blog/what-went-right-criminal-justicereform-86th-session [https://perma.cc/L4TP-4THL] (noting bail reform failed to pass during the
86th Legislative Session).
11. See McCullough, supra note 1 (quoting Governor Abbott’s comments on criminal justice
reform).
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commenced with the invasion of the United States from China, by the
coronavirus, which soon turned into a nationwide pandemic. This ongoing
event would seem to have absolutely no relationship to decisions made for
pre-trial bail. However, on March 13, 2020, the governor declared that the
pandemic had created an imminent disaster within the State of Texas, and
pursuant to the powers vested in his office by Texas Government Code
Section 418.014, he would exercise such powers as necessary to ensure the
public safety.12
Barely more than two weeks after issuing twelve other executive orders
applying to the general public and Texas businesses, and with no warning at
all, Governor Abbott issued Executive Order 13.13 This order held,
without factual justification, that many counties were “considering broadscale releases of arrested or jailed individuals,” potentially including those
who have committed felonies, due to the pandemic causing the need to
reduce jail populations.14 The governor concluded that this was a grave
threat to public safety and it would hinder efforts to combat the
pandemic.15 The governor then ordered the suspension of four criminal
statutes, three of which allowed for pre-trial bail and one that allowed for
the reduction of one’s sentence for good conduct.16
These were the exact statutes related to pre-trial release and good time
sentence-reduction that the legislature had considered and failed to amend
and/or repeal in 2019 by H.B. 2020 to establish a more sensible system.17
So too, they are also the same statutes targeted for amendment or repeal by
the governor in which he had suffered rare defeats within the legislature.18
Yet, there were immediate concerns from health experts that “[j]ails and
prisons are overcrowded, inmates share everything from cells to showers to

12. The Governor of the State of Tex., Proclamation of March 13, 2020, 45 Tex. Reg. 2087,
2094 (2020).
13. The Governor of the State of Tex., Executive Order GA-13, 45 Tex. Reg. 2361, 2368–69
(2020).
14. Id. at 2369.
15. Id.
16. Id. (mentioning specifically the following sections from the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure: Section 17.03 Personal Bond; 17.151 Release on Personal Bond if Delay of Trial; 15.21
Release on Personal Bond if Not Timely Demanded; 42.032 Good Conduct-Reduction of Sentence;
and 42.035 Release with Electronic Monitoring).
17. Tex. H.B. 2020, 86th Leg., R.S. (2019).
18. See Mergler, supra note 10 (“Comprehensive bail reform was derailed by the introduction of
a weaker bill with the [g]overnor’s backing.”).
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dining spaces, and inmates have few resources for proper hygiene.19
Without room to social distance, proper hygiene becomes even more
important. [However,] most correctional facilities do not provide soap, and
hand sanitizer has been banned in most prisons because it can be used to
brew toxic alcoholic drinks.”20
Despite these obvious concerns, one might be willing to defer to the
governor when dealing with such a catastrophic pandemic. However, soon
after the issuance of Executive Order 13, Attorney General Paxton issued a
press release stating, “The unlawful release of 5,000 potentially violent
criminals would directly endanger Texans. A health crisis cannot be used as
an excuse to override the rule of law.”21
Yet, the governor’s and attorney general’s official statements of wholly
illegal activities by county and state officers were made with absolutely no
facts or witness testimony to verify it, and the attorney general came up with
a figure, with absolutely no proof, of 5000 felons fleeing through the streets
of Texas!22 Finally, the attorney general cites the “rule of law,”23 but would
that not be fulfilled by only allowing the release of those inmates that the
four current laws allow rather than suspending them as the governor did in
his executive order?
The intent and good faith of the governor and attorney general may be
debatable, but the conversation radically changes if it can be established that
he knew or clearly should have known, as a licensed attorney himself, that
he simply had no statutory power under Chapter 418 to suspend these
criminal laws. The governor relied solely on this statutory provision in
Executive Order 13.24

19. Jerusalem Demsas, 80 Percent of Those Who Died of Covid-19 in Texas County Jails were Never
Convicted of a Crime, VOX (Nov. 12, 2020, 2:50 PM) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted), https://www.vox.com/2020/11/12/21562278/jails-prisons-texas-covid-19-coronaviruscrime-prisoners-death [https://perma.cc/SED4-MCKJ].
20. Id.
21. Press Release, Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas, AG Paxton Defends Governor
Abbott’s Executive Order Prohibiting the Release of Dangerous Individuals from Dallas Jails (Apr. 15,
2020), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/ag-paxton-defends-governor-abbottsexecutive-order-prohibiting-release-dangerous-individuals-dallas [https://perma.cc/V3FA-QQCC].
22. See id.
23. Id.
24. The Governor of the State of Tex., Executive Order GA-13, 45 Tex. Reg. 2361, 2369
(2020).
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II. TEX. GOV’T CODE, CHAPTER 418: THE POWER OF THE
TEXAS GOVERNOR DURING A STATE DISASTER
A. Reading the Statute as a Whole
It is true that, Governor Abbott, in issuing Executive Order 13, was
acting pursuant to his constitutional authority. Article IV, Section 10 of the
Texas Constitution grants him the power to faithfully execute the laws.25
Yet, that power only extends as far as the constitutional words make clear,
that is, the power is governed and limited by the words in the statute.
Therefore, the existence and/or extent of the governor’s power is based
solely on statutory interpretation and the final determination of what that
law means is for the judiciary to decide.26
A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that any particular word or
phrase must be consistent with the statute’s reading as a whole.27
In construing Chapter 418 in its entirety, there is absolutely no express
mention of the power of the governor to affect the workings of the judiciary
or suspend criminal laws. The Supreme Court of Texas has often held that
“every word of a statute must be presumed to have been used for a purpose.
Likewise, we believe every word excluded from a statute must also be
presumed to have been excluded for a purpose.”28 The legislature clearly
knows how to write “judiciary” and “criminal laws” or even “penal laws”
and it simply did not do so. There can be no question that these omissions
were deliberate.
B. The Governor May Suspend Regulatory Laws and Agency Rules
In Executive Order 13, the governor first, specifically relies upon Section
418.016(a),29 which provides that “[t]he governor may suspend the
provisions of any regulatory statute prescribing the procedure for conduct
25. TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
26. See Havlen v. McDougall, 22 S.W.3d 343, 345 (Tex. 2000) (noting statutory interpretation is
a question of law, not fact); see also, Ron Beal, The Art of Statutory Construction: Texas Style, 64 BAYLOR L.
REV. 339, 351–53 (2012) (referring to the judiciary as a “caregiver” of a statute).
27. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011); HCBeck, Ltd.
v. Rice, 284 S.W.3d 349, 352 (Tex. 2009) (explaining the steps of statutory construction); see Beal, supra
note 26 at 374–75 (discussing the analysis of a statute as a whole).
28. In re Bell, 91 S.W.3d 784, 790 (Tex. 2002) (citations omitted) (quoting Cameron v. Terrell &
Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 540 (Tex. 1981)); see also Beal, supra note 26 at 397–98 (“When the
legislature includes a provision in one part of a statute, but omits it in another, that may be precisely
what the legislature intended.”).
29. The Governor of the State of Tex., Executive Order GA-13, 45 Tex. Reg. 2361, 2369 (2020).
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of state business . . . or rules of a state agency . . . .”30 When the legislature
uses a term with an accepted legal meaning without a statutory definition,
the Supreme Court of Texas has held it was intended by the legislature for
it to be given its legal meaning.31 The use of the phrase “regulatory statutes”
has no ordinary meaning, but it is one used by lawyers and courts.32 It is
asserted this phrase is so commonly understood within the law, that it is
undisputed the phrase includes only civil laws where most, but not all, are
to be administered by executive agencies with rulemaking authority to fulfill
the purposes of the statute.33
However, since at least 1972, the United States Supreme Court has made
a distinction between regulatory statutes which regulate businesses that are
civil in nature, and criminal statutes which are penal in nature.34 That is the
exact language of Chapter 418 quoted above that allows the suspension of
regulatory statutes “for [the] conduct of state business.”35 The Texas Supreme
Court, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, and many other courts of
appeals have cited to the same definition as the United States Supreme
Court in making the distinction between regulatory and criminal laws.36
Statutes related to the conduct of business have no relationship to the
criminal justice system or its laws. In all of the cited cases, the courts all
refer to the fact that, in contrast to civil laws regulating business, the
legislature adopts penal or criminal laws.37

30. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 418.016(a).
31. See McBride v. Clayton, 166 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex. 1942) (indicating existing statutes and
court decision determine the meaning and effect of other statutes’ language); Shook v. Walden,
304 S.W.3d 910, 917 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, pet. denied) (“We should also read every word, phrase,
and expression in a statute as if it were deliberately chosen, and likewise presume that words excluded
from the statute are done so purposefully.”); see also Beal, supra note 26 at 386–88 (explaining how a
term is defined within a statute).
32. See infra notes 34, 36–37 and accompanying discussion.
33. See generally RON BEAL, TEXAS ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ch. 1 (23rd
ed. 2020).
34. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162–63 (1972).
35. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 418.016(a) (emphasis added).
36. Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 689 (Tex. 1980) (citing Papachristou, 405 U.S.
at 162); Ely v. State, 582 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (same); Anding v. City of Austin,
No. 03-18-00307-CV, 2020 WL 2048255, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 29, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(same); City of Houston v. Harris Cnty Outdoor Adv. Ass’n, 732 S.W.2d 42, 51 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (same); Huett v. Texas, 672 S.W.2d 533, 537 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1984, no writ).
37. Pennington, 606 S.W.2d at 689; Ely, 582 S.W.2d at 419; Anding, 2020 WL 2048255, at *5;
Harris Cnty Outdoor Adv. Ass’n, 732 S.W.2d at 51; Huett, 672 S.W.2d at 537.
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It also goes without citation that the phrases “criminal law” or “penal
law” are the only phrases used by the legislature for laws that set forth
prohibitions that will result in a criminal fine, incarceration, or other
punishment. It is simply absurd and nonsensical to read the phrase
“regulatory statutes” to include criminal or penal laws when not so stated or
defined.38 The glaring omission of these phrases from the statute, by itself,
is compelling evidence that the legislature had absolutely no intention of
empowering the governor to suspend such laws.39
In addition, the title of this section of the statute is “Suspension of Certain
Laws and Rules.”40 The plain meaning of these words makes clear, the
legislature was focusing on “certain” civil, regulatory statutes and the rules
of state agencies. The legislature did not state “any and all” laws or “the
laws of the State of Texas.” The legislature deliberately stated the governor
may suspend regulatory laws and rules.41 That was it and it was deliberate.
Also, another canon of statutory construction mandates that the courts
read a term within its phrase and sentence, and not in isolation.42 For a
court should not give one provision a meaning that is out of harmony or
inconsistent with the other provisions, although it might be susceptible to
such a construction standing alone.43 The statute speaks in terms of
regulatory laws and the rules of a “state agency.”44 By the legislature
adopting the phrase “state agency,” not defining the phrase and not merely
stating “agency” or “governmental body,” the legislature was clearly
referring, once again, to state agencies who enforce civil and not criminal
law. This is so, for the courts will always presume the legislature adopts a
law with full knowledge of existing laws and with reference to them.45 The
phrase “state agency” has a definite legal meaning set forth in the
Administrative Procedure Act, applying to agencies that enforce civil laws,

38. A statute must be interpreted to reach a fair and reasonable, not an absurd, result. See TGSNOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011); City of Dallas v. Abbott,
304 S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex. 2010).
39. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
40. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 418.016.
41. Id. § 418.016(a).
42. See City of Waco v. Kelley, 309 S.W.3d 536, 542 (Tex. 2010) (stating the Court does not read
terms in statutes in insolation).
43. Id.
44. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 418.016(a).
45. McBride v. Clayton, 166 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex.1942); see also In re Pirelli Tire, LLC,
247 S.W.3d 670, 677 (Tex. 2007).
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of “a state officer, board, commission or department of statewide
jurisdiction that makes rules or determines contested cases.”46
C. The Governor’s Power as to the Movement of People
The governor also relied on another specific provision in Chapter 418
that allows him to “control ingress and egress to and from a disaster area
and the movement of persons and the occupancy of premises in the area.”47
The first part of this provision is inapplicable because the governor declared
a state of disaster for all counties in the State of Texas. Thus, there is no
need to control the ingress and egress to and from a disaster area.48
However, by suspending the right of parole or early release from prison, the
governor was clearly relying upon his power to suspend laws prohibiting the
release of citizens from jail or prison when the criminal law otherwise
provides that they should be released. The governor was clearly restricting
the inmates’ movement within the disaster area and mandating occupancy
within a jail or prison.
However, this entire statutory provision is simply a nullity, for the
governor has no power to suspend criminal laws. Criminal laws, without
need of citation, have dictated the current residence of these inmates.
Clearly, a condition precedent for the ability to control persons’ actions is
the ability of the governor to suspend any law that would be inconsistent
with his order. Since he cannot suspend criminal laws, the legislature is
evidencing a clear intent that he cannot take control of the entire state
criminal justice system and county jails by executive order.
Reaffirming what was set forth at the beginning of this analysis,49 for the
governor to assert that he has the power to assume control of the entire
criminal justice system and county jails without the statute mentioning either
set of entities is simply absurd.50 It goes without citation that the entire
focus of these systems is clearly to control the physical whereabouts and
conditions of the confinement of inmates. Under the governor’s
interpretation, the legislature gave him that power despite never once
mentioning this massive criminal justice system by name.

46. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.003(7).
47. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 418.018(c).
48. The Governor of the State of Tex., Proclamation of March 13, 2020, 45 Tex. Reg. 2087,
2095 (2020).
49. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, a common sense reading of these words is that the
governor is able to order citizens where they must go or not go when he
otherwise has no such authority to do so under existing laws. It removes
the power and discretion of a citizen to be or not be in any legal place he or
she chooses. Again, someone who is involuntarily, physically detained by
the judiciary has no freedom that can or needs to be restricted by the
governor. The only way the prison population must comply with a
governor’s order is for other state officers, namely the judiciary, to violate
existing criminal statutes that dictate whether an inmate remains in jail or
prison or not. It has been established that the legislature granted no such
powers to the governor. The Texas Supreme Court held long ago that a
“legislature legislates by legislating, not by doing nothing, not by keeping
silent.”51 When it comes to the validity of criminal laws and the power of
the judiciary to enforce those provisions during a disaster, the legislature
clearly did not grant the governor the power to do so pursuant to
Chapter 418.
D. Enforcement of Executive Order 13
Executive Order 13 stated that “no authority” could release a person
pursuant to the suspended criminal statutes during the pendency of the
order.52 Of course, it was unquestioned that such “authority” would be a
district or county court judge. Violation of an executive order under
Chapter 418 could result in criminal prosecution, a fine of up to $1000.00
and a sentence of up to 180 days in jail.53 This simply means that the
governor believed Chapter 418 gave him the authority to criminally
prosecute constitutional judges when they are exercising their constitutional
duties to determine the constitutionality, statutory validity, and application
of an executive order.
Once again, this conclusion was made despite the fact that Chapter 418
makes absolutely no mention of the Judicial Branch generally or district and
county court judges specifically.54 It is simply beyond reasonable
contemplation that the governor could in any way reasonably believe that
an Executive Branch order could subject a constitutional officer to criminal

51.
52.
(2020).
53.
54.

Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Tex. 1983) (citation omitted).
The Governor of the State of Tex., Executive Order GA-13, 45 Tex. Reg. 2361, 2369
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 418.173 (c).
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 418.001 et seq.
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prosecution for exercising his or her constitutional duties. Particularly, due
to the fact that the United States Supreme Court has long recognized the
principle that the judiciary must be free of domination by other branches of
government.55 For our licensed attorney-governor to even consider, and
then finally require in the executive order, that all district and county court
judges must comply or be prosecuted, is once again, absurd (a tired phrase,
but nonetheless true).
In fact, the more reasonable and constitutional approach is to do what
the legislature actually accomplished, that is, to expressly give regulatory
power to the Texas Supreme Court which clearly and unambiguously
established that the governor does not have such power. That statutory
provision was wholly absent from Executive Order 13.
E. Texas Gov’t Code Section 22.0035(b)
The Texas Supreme Court set the standard for this statutory canon in
1942 and its use in this context: “[a]ll statutes are presumed to be enacted
by the legislature with full knowledge of the existing condition[s] of the law
and with reference to it.”56 Chapter 418, also known as the Texas Disaster
Act of 1975, was created under the auspices of the Executive Branch and
finally codified in 1987.57 In 2009, the Legislature amended the Texas
Government Code, Title 2, Courts, and specifically added
Section 22.0035.58 Therefore, the legislature was well aware of the powers
it had granted the governor when Section 22.0035 was adopted. Further,
actual knowledge is clear, for Section 22.0035(a) adopts the exact definition
of a “disaster” as set forth in Chapter 418.59
Section 22.0035(b) expressly provides that the Supreme Court of Texas
“may modify or suspend procedures of any court proceeding affected by a disaster during
the pendency of a disaster declared by the governor.”60 Thereby, the judiciary will
charge the legislature with knowledge of the powers conferred upon the
governor in Section 418, that such power did not include the ability to
modify criminal laws or order judges on how to conduct their proceedings,
if at all, and imply that they knowingly granted such powers to the Texas
55. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217–18 (1980).
56. McBride v. Clayton, 166 S.W.2d 125, 128 (1942); see also In re Pirelli Tire, LLC, 247 S.W.3d
670, 677 (Tex. 2007) (same).
57. Acts May 21, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 147, § 1, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 316, 317.
58. Acts June 19, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 1280, § 5.01, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 4032, 4046.
59. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 418.004(1).
60. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.0035(b) (emphasis added).
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Supreme Court since such power had not been granted to the governor.
There would be no reasonable basis to conclude otherwise, for it would be
absurd to read the two statutes to grant the same power simultaneously to
both branches of government. Once again, the judiciary will interpret
statutes to reach a fair and reasonable result and not an absurd one.61
In addition, the judiciary will interpret a statute to be feasible in execution62
and not a useless act.63 Thus, it is not even debatable that there would not
be any sane reason or reasonable basis to construe the two statutory
provisions in such a manner.
This grant of power is clearly very broad. “Any” is defined as “used to
indicate one selected without restriction.”64 “Proceeding” is defined as
“[t]he regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit, including all acts and
events between the time of commencement and the entry of judgment.”65
Finally, “procedural law” is defined as “[t]he rules that prescribe the steps
for having a right or duty judicially enforced, as opposed to the law that
defines the specific rights or duties themselves.”66 Thus, there is no
question that the legislature delegated by statute to the Texas Supreme Court
any and all powers to control any proceeding of any kind regarding the
rights, duties, and privileges of parties who are part of a criminal or civil
proceeding.
There is no debate that in a criminal proceeding where a defendant has
been arrested, charged, and is awaiting her or his criminal trial, an integral
part of that process is determining when or if the defendant is entitled to be
released on bail. Thereby, it is unquestioned that the legislature delegated
to the Texas Supreme Court the power to decide if and when such hearings
should be held, and if not, where the defendant will remain incarcerated in
the meantime pending the reduction of the pandemic’s negative effects on
this process.
Therefore, the adoption of Section 22.035 clearly and unambiguously sets
forth that if any criminal law is to be suspended during a governor-declared
disaster, it is exclusively the power of the Supreme Court of Texas to do so,
which clearly implies that absolutely no such power is vested in the
governor.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011).
Lovell v. State., 525 S.W.2d 511, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
In re Mo Pac. R. R. Co., 998 S.W.2d 212, 216 (Tex. 1999).
Any, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY 154 (2021).
Proceeding, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
Procedural law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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It also appears that not only did the legislature delegate to the Supreme
Court of Texas the power to regulate the proceedings of any and all courts
regarding any and all types of hearings during the pandemic, the legislature
was constitutionally required to do so. The Texas Supreme Court has held
that, not only does the Texas Constitution give express grants of power to
the judiciary, there are inherent powers woven into the fabric of the Texas
Constitution by virtue of their origin in the separation of powers provision
of our state’s Constitution.67 The inherent judicial power of a court is not
derived from legislative grant or a specific constitutional provision, but from
the very fact that the court has been created and charged by the Texas
Constitution with certain duties and responsibilities. The inherent powers
of a court are those which it may call upon to aid in the exercise of its
jurisdiction in the administration of justice, and in the preservation of its
independence and integrity.68 This power exists to enable our courts to
effectively perform their judicial functions and to protect their dignity,
independence, and integrity.69 Thus, the Supreme Court of Texas has held,
without hesitation, that in our adversary system, a court has not only the
power, but the duty to do so.70
It is simply indisputable that if a court is unable to control the physical
appearance of its criminally-charged defendants for any type of hearing
required, it has lost its ability to function. That power could be impacted by
releasing such persons due to a pandemic or by their illegal and involuntary
detention in a prison environment that could lead to a severe illness and/or
death. Without debate, the timely appearance of a defendant in the criminal
justice system is the fundamental prerequisite for a rule-of-law judiciary to
maintain its dignity, independence, and integrity to ensure our citizenry that
those who violated the law will answer for it in a court of law.
Finally, the absolute proof of legislative intent is apparently the clear and
unambiguous language of the statute.71 As the Supreme Court of Texas has
long held, if the disputed statute is clear and unambiguous, the statute
should be given its common, everyday meaning.72 Section 22.0035(b)
67. TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1.
68. See Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398–99 (Tex. 1979) (describing the
powers of Texas courts).
69. Id.
70. P.U.C. of Tex. v. Cofer, 754 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex. 1988).
71. See In re Smith, 333 S.W.3d 582, 586–87 (Tex. 2011) (noting the legislature says what it
means when it is stated in clear and unambiguous language).
72. Id. at 586.
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begins
with:
“Notwithstanding
any
other
statute . . . .”73
74
This is in effect an
“Notwithstanding” means “despite; in spite of.”
express statement to the governor that, even if he reasonably believed
Chapter 418 vested him with power to control the judiciary, he in fact has
absolutely no power over the entire justice system, or specifically, the
criminal justice system and bail hearings. Nothing could be clearer, and it is
simply impossible with this language to find that Chapter 418 in any way
grants the governor power to suspend criminal procedural laws related to
bail or to confine citizens in jail or prison when the statutes so provide for
their physical release. Even if a court could be persuaded that it does, this
opening phrase is clear legislative intent that such interpretation is a nullity.
III. GOVERNOR ABBOTT INDISPUTABLY VIOLATED SEPARATION
OF POWERS IN ISSUING EXECUTIVE ORDER 13
The Framers of the Texas Constitution clearly believed that separation of
powers between our three branches of government was so important that
they dedicated an entire article solely to that requirement:
Section 1: SEPARATION OF POWERS AMONG THREE
DEPARTMENTS. The powers of the government of the State of Texas shall be divided
into three distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a separate body of
magistracy, to wit: Those which are Legislative to one, those which are Executive to another,
and those which are Judicial to another; and no person, or collection of persons being of one
of these departments, shall exercise any power attached to either of the others, except in the
instances herein expressly permitted.75

As was discussed supra,76 the governor exercises his constitutional power
to faithfully execute the laws, but the question of the extent of power
granted is simply an issue of statutory construction, which is ultimately
determined by the judiciary. It goes without citation that an officer can
misinterpret a statute, which is the very reason for the existence of the
judiciary—to set him or her straight as to the legislative intent. Therefore,
there is a strong argument that Governor Abbott’s illegal Executive Order
13 was clearly not a violation of separation of powers, but merely a good
faith mistake.
73.
74.
75.
76.

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.0035(b).
Notwithstanding, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1.
See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol53/iss2/2

14

Beal: A Pandemic of Separation of Powers Violations in Texas

2022]

A PANDEMIC OF SEPARATION OF POWERS VIOLATIONS IN TEXAS

401

However, first, it has been demonstrated that interpreting Chapter 418 as
granting him control over 447 district courts and 500 county courts, having
the ability to suspend criminal procedure statutes, and subjecting them to
possible criminal prosecution if they fail to follow an executive order has
absolutely no basis in the language of the statute.77 Second, a different
statutory provision adopted eleven years ago delegated the very same power
exclusively to the Texas Supreme Court.78 Third, the Texas Supreme Court
has held for over forty years that the judiciary, as a constitutional creature,
has the inherent constitutional power to maintain control of the district
courts and county courts in the administration of justice and to protect the
dignity, independence, and integrity of the judicial system.79
With absolutely no statutory or constitutional power, Governor Abbott
seized the control of the judiciary, suspended laws he has no authority to
suspend, and threatened almost one thousand judges with criminal
prosecution if they do not obey his orders instead of those of the Texas
Supreme Court. That act simply is a gross usurpation of judicial powers,
and there is absolutely no reasonable legal defense to negate that legal
conclusion.
Even more troubling is the concern cited by the governor in Executive
Order 13 that the existing bail laws were a threat to the public welfare was
not new.80 It was the exact basis for attempting to repeal and/or amend
the existing statutes that Governor Abbott has suspended for two legislative
sessions during the pandemic, but the bills died in the houses.81 Therefore,
in the minds of the governor and his staff, the factual basis to wholly
suspend the criminal statutes had absolutely nothing uniquely to do with the
pandemic per se, but constituted a long term, ongoing problem. In fact,
Governor Abbott stated at the beginning of the 2021 Legislative Session
that reforming the existing bail laws was a priority for the governor’s office
because “Texas has a broken bail system that allows dangerous criminals to
go free.”82 That is clearly not a disaster/pandemic problem, but an ongoing
institutional problem.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See supra notes 25–51 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 56–74 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 12–16 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 12–20 and accompanying text.
Jeremy Wallace, Gov. Greg Abbott Calls for Another Fix to ‘Broken Bail System’, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/politics/texas/article/Gov-GregAbbott-calls-for-another-fix-to-15888901.php [https://perma.cc/SEE8-SVWU].
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This appears to be overwhelming evidence that Governor Abbott has
had major frustration with the legislature’s inability to fix the bail system for
years, and he merely used the pandemic as a cover to nullify the bail laws he
deplored. There is simply no evidence how the pandemic itself created a
higher danger or risk to the general public by the bail system operating as
usual. In fact, clearly the Supreme Court of Texas did not believe so, for
the court took no action to curb releases from jail under its statutory or
constitutional authority.
This appeared to be validated by a press release of
Attorney General Paxton. He indicated the health and safety of Texans was
paramount during the pandemic. He then made the most remarkable
statement that “a health crisis cannot be used as an excuse to override the
rule of law.”83 This statement is the actual reverse of what happened. The
governor utilized his disaster power to override the criminal procedure bail
laws that had been in place and applicable for years.
Governor Abbott simply utilized Chapter 418 to literally take over the
Judicial system as to whether or not a citizen would be released on bail.
IV. THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT VIOLATED THE SEPARATION
OF POWERS PROVISION BY ALLOWING GOVERNOR ABBOTT TO SEIZE
ITS CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY POWER
A. Supreme Court’s Failure to Exercise Its Inherent and Statutory Power to Nullify
Executive Order 13 Violates Separation of Powers
It has been established that Section 22.0035(b) grants the Supreme Court
of Texas the exclusive, express power to suspend bail statutes and to order
district and county court judges on how to proceed with such requests
during the pandemic.84 It has also been established that the Supreme Court
of Texas would clearly be aware that Chapter 418 did not confer power on
the governor to suspend bail statutes, to order judges on how to conduct or
not conduct bail hearings, and to suspend bail statutes by executive order.85
Nothing could be clearer than the beginning phrase of this section that states
83. Press Release, Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas, AG Paxton Defends Governor
Abbott’s Executive Order Prohibiting the Release of Dangerous Individuals from Dallas Jails;
(April 15, 2020), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/ag-paxton-defends-governorabbotts-executive-order-prohibiting-release-dangerous-individuals-dallas [https://perma.cc/V3FAQQCC].
84. See supra notes 56–74 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 25–55 and accompanying text.
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“Notwithstanding any other statute . . . .”86 Finally, it has been established
that the Supreme Court of Texas has held they have the constitutional,
inherent power and duty to aid in the administration of justice and to
preserve the independence and integrity of the Court.87 This is further
buttressed by the fact that the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct requires the
Court to diligently and promptly discharge its administrative
responsibilities.88
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Texas knew from the day that
Governor Abbott’s Executive Order 13 was issued that it was a nullity and
did not have the force and effect of law. The Texas Supreme Court knew
it had the unqualified power, statutorily and constitutionally, to issue an
order relating to the criminal bail statutes and to direct all district and county
court judges on how they were to proceed in determining bail requests
during the pandemic. This did not necessitate a lawsuit to be filed, but
merely the issuance of an administrative order. The Supreme Court of
Texas clearly understands how to exercise this power since it has issued, up
until the time of this writing, 34 Emergency Orders pursuant to
Section 22.0035 on the basis of Governor Abbott’s Proclamation that a
disaster was occurring throughout the State of Texas due to the coronavirus
pandemic.89 By failing to act, the Court violated its constitutional duty to
protect the integrity of the Court and violated separation of powers to allow
the governor’s unlawful order to control the constitutional duties of the
Court and the district and county court judges.
Yet, the Supreme Court of Texas has done nothing, allowing
Governor Abbott’s invalid order to remain in effect that on its face applies
to nearly a thousand judges holding bail hearings and thousands of
incarcerated citizens seeking release. The Court need not in any way
formally declare the governor’s order invalid or place in their order a
statement that the judges are to disregard the governor, for there is no
question that all of the judges would know that it was invalid and that the
valid authority was vested in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of
Texas could even conclude the governor was correct about the bail situation
and issue an emergency order nearly identical to that of the governor’s order.
However, it would then be lawful so that all the judges could lawfully deny
86. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.0035(b).
87. See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
88. Tex. Code of Jud. Conduct, Canon 3(C)(1), as reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2,
subtit. G., app. B. (As Amended by the Supreme Court of Texas through July 10, 2019).
89. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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bail and not be subject to the unconstitutional, yet real threat, of being
prosecuted by the local district or county attorney for violating Executive
Order 13.
Why would the Supreme Court of Texas initially not act and continue to
not act? Why would the Court not easily conclude the independence of the
judiciary is severely compromised by the governor usurping its own power
and threatening judges with criminal prosecution for doing their
constitutionally mandated job? Why would the Court not view the
governor’s order as a threat to its integrity when nearly a thousand judges
are unlawfully denying citizens release from confinement which these
citizens are currently entitled to under the law? There is simply no known
or obvious reason for their non-action. Yet it is clear that it blatantly violates
the Code of Judicial Conduct that mandates an independent and honorable
judiciary that is indispensable to justice in our society.90
However, there can be no debate that this real scenario is a blatant
violation of separation of powers that stands equally beside the
unconstitutional acts of Governor Abbott.
B. The Supreme Court’s Willingness to Hear and Decide a Legal Challenge by
Houston District Court Judges Violates Separation of Powers and the Code
of Judicial Conduct
Sixteen Houston County Criminal County Courts of Law Judges sued the
governor and the attorney general, alleging constitutional violations and that
the governor had acted outside of his statutory power.91 A Travis County
district judge held in favor of the Houston judges and issued a temporary
restraining order against Executive Order 13.92 The governor and attorney
general then filed an emergency petition for writ of mandamus and a motion
to stay in the Texas Supreme Court.93
What is truly remarkable is that the Court sat and decided to determine
the writ at all. As it has been established, the only reason that Executive
Order 13 was subject to challenge is due to the failure of the Texas Supreme
Court to issue its own emergency order to replace it. The writ dispute could
have been resolved at any time before or during the activation of the Court’s

90. Tex. Code of Jud. Conduct, Canon 1, as reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit.
G., app. B. (As Amended by the Supreme Court of Texas through July 10, 2019).
91. In re Abbott, 601 S.W.3d 802, 806 (Tex. 2020).
92. Id. at 807.
93. Id.
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jurisdiction by the mere issuance of an emergency administrative order by
the Supreme Court. In essence, all nine members of the Supreme Court of
Texas were unnamed parties to the controversy and most obviously, they
could not be impartial because they would have to defend themselves for
their failure to act and their violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The Code clearly prohibits the Court from deciding matters in which they
are disqualified or where recusal is appropriate.94 There is no question the
full Court was prohibited on both counts by being, in essence, unnamed
parties to the dispute, and that on the basis of a separate and distinct power,
the Constitution and the disaster statute, the Court could fully resolve the
controversy at any time. Why did the Court proceed to hear and decide the
emergency writ? It is simply unknown.
Was there a bona fide legal basis to make this controversy go away on a
non-merit basis, and thereby to dismiss it? The Houston judges strongly
asserted that they had standing to bring this lawsuit, for the governor and
attorney general were clear, based on certain statements they had publicly
made, that the judges would be prosecuted.95 However, in briefing, the
governor and attorney general both stated they had no legal authority to do
so, for that was vested in the independent, local district attorneys. Further,
they both stated that they had no intention to affirmatively enforce
Executive Order 1396 However, the governor and attorney general in no
specific words assured the court they would even attempt to dissuade an
independent, local district attorney from doing so. Based solely on the
statements of the governor and attorney general, the Texas Supreme Court
held that it was simply unsubstantiated speculation that prosecutions would
materialize, which was insufficient to establish a credible threat of
prosecution of the sitting district and county judges. In sum, the sixteen
judges lacked constitutional standing to sue.97
It is truly difficult to conclude the Court’s holding is reasonable when a
judge knows the very act that he or she might take (granting bail) is clearly
a violation of the law. Further making the Court’s holding difficult to find
reasonable is that an independent district attorney, who has no direct
dependence on or subject to any order of how to perform his or her job by
the governor or attorney general, will simply comply with the requests of
94. Tex. Code of Jud. Conduct, Canon 3(B)(1), as reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2,
subtit. G., app. B. (As Amended by the Supreme Court of Texas through July 10, 2019).
95. In re Abbott, 601 S.W.3d at 808–09.
96. Id. at 812.
97. Id. at 809.
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the same to not prosecute the judge when he or she has an airtight case of
conviction. The truly unusual and novel act of these sixteen judges suing
the governor and attorney general might be considered very persuasive
evidence that the court clearly weighed the evidence of potential
prosecution incorrectly. In hindsight even more so, since at the time of the
writing of this Article, none of the nearly one thousand judges have ruled in
a bail determination that Executive Order 13 is invalid, suggesting a chilling
effect on judges following the decision. Further, the governor has never
amended Executive Order 13 to expressly exclude the judges from
prosecution.
However, by eliminating, in the Court’s mind, any direct, personal threat
or injury to the judges, it was a foregone conclusion that the writ of
mandamus would be granted to dissolve the injunction and to dismiss the
lawsuit.98 Generally, when a judge is confronted with a law that he or she
believes is invalid for whatever reason, the Court stated the absolute obvious
conclusion that all lawyers and judges understand regarding how the judicial
system works: “Nor can one judge file a lawsuit against the executive branch
that asks another judge to clarify the rule of decision the plaintiff judge
should apply in his or her courtroom, as the judicial plaintiffs have done
here.”99 Therefore, the emergency writ was granted and the lawsuit was
dismissed.100
Conveniently, this ruling eliminated the need for the Court to alter the
status quo. If a decision on the merits of the legality of Executive Order 13
was forced upon the Court, this Article has established that the clear and
unambiguous language of the applicable laws would have forced the Court
to strike it down as illegal. However, that did not happen due to the Court’s
own interpretation of constitutional standing and determining the motives
of district attorneys exercising prosecutorial powers. Therefore, up until the
writing of this Article, the Texas Supreme Court continues to violate
separation of powers by failing to exercise both its constitutional duty and
statutory powers to administratively nullify Executive Order 13, and thus,
continues allowing a severe impact on the honesty and integrity of the
judiciary by forcing district and county judges to unlawfully hold citizens in
jail due to an executive order that violates the law and the Constitution.

98. Id. at 813.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 813.
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Yet, these conclusions are disputed by Attorney General Paxton who,
following the dismissal of the lawsuit avoiding a ruling on the merits of
Executive Order 13, stated: “The court’s ruling rightly upholds the rule of
law and maintains the integrity of our criminal justice system.”101
The decision obviously did nothing of the sort, but instead allowed an illegal
order to remain in effect despite the Texas Supreme Court’s power to nullify
it.
C. The District and County Court Judges Are Violating Separation of Powers and
the Code of Judicial Conduct
In analyzing these acts by governmental officers, it could appear to some
that the district and county court judges are victims in this scenario by being
subject to an unlawful executive order and a Supreme Court who is
unwilling to exercise its constitutional and statutory power to remove it.
Even in the outrageous context that the Supreme Court was considering a
challenge to the executive order by judges, it could not help but chastise the
judges by stating: “the executive branch cannot criminally prosecute judges
for deciding cases based on what they understand the law to be. We appeal
judicial decisions we don’t like; we don’t jail the judges.”102 The Court
continued:
Moreover, even if criminal prosecution of judges were genuinely threatened,
the plaintiffs [judges] offer no reason to doubt that long-established principles
of judicial immunity provide adequate protection . . . . Judicial immunity
prevents such “domination by other branches” by giving a Judge absolute
immunity from liability for official acts performed within the scope of his or
her jurisdiction.103

So why are all of these judges paralyzed and unable to grant bail under
existing valid law to these thousands of Texan citizens? They have the
constitutional power to do so and it will be the rare district attorney who
will prosecute based on the statements of the Court. Even if they do, the

101. Press Release, Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas, AG Paxton: Texas Supreme Court
Overturns Injunction Against Governor Abbott’s Executive Order Prohibiting the Release of
Dangerous Individuals, (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/agpaxton-texas-supreme-court-overturns-injunction-against-governor-abbotts-executive-order [https://
perma.cc/4Y8Q-SH8M]
102. In re Abbott, 601 S.W.3d at 809.
103. Id. at 813.
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Court told the judges they would have blanket immunity, for they were
simply doing their job.
The acts or failure to act by the Texas Supreme Court and the nearly one
thousand district and county court judges is a complete mystery. Allowing
such damage to the integrity of the judicial system generally, to their own
personal reputation as a judge, and to simply tolerate the unlawful detention
of thousands of Texas citizens would seem to require a very significant
reason to act in this manner. There is simply no concrete evidence as to
why this is occurring.
V. CONCLUSION
Finally, it is unclear if these multiple violations of separation of powers is
having or will have any lasting effect on the functioning of our government
or citizens’ respect for and willingness to abide by the laws and orders of
our state officers. At the present time, however, there appears to be no
awareness by the media or citizens generally as to what has happened as
described in this Article. Such actions cannot stand, and there is a truly
significant need to confront all involved for an explanation and justification
for what has and has not happened during the life of Executive Order 13.
However, the most telling effect is a report by the University of Texas at
Austin, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs citing the total number
of COVID deaths in county jails, eighty percent of whom were in pre-trial
detention and were not convicted of a crime.104

104. Michele Deitch et al., Covid and Corrections: A Profile of Covid Deaths in Custody in Texas,
LYNDON B. JOHNSON SCHOOL OF PUB. AFFAIRS 18 (Nov. 2020), https://repositories.lib.utexas.
edu/bitstream/handle/2152/83635/Profile%20of%20COVID%20deaths%20in%20custody.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R9S7-73F7].
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